This paper provides new evidence on the evolution of ownership of a large sample of 
Over the period of 1999 to 2007 35% to 48% of all companies in the 1999 sample were delisted. In the remainder of the companies, ownership concentration decreased slightly over the last 8 years in three countries -France, Italy and Belgium-but increased in two others, Spain and the UK. The largest shareholder has on average a voting block between 35% and 45% in France, Spain, Italy and Belgium, in the UK around 20%. In the latter country there are many other large shareholders with a stake of more than 5%, hence reducing the powerful position of the largest shareholder. In the other countries the other large shareholders own collectively less than 50% of the voting block of the largest shareholder. The latter reins the general meeting of shareholders.
In France, Italy and Belgium approximately half of the companies have a de jure controlling shareholder. The numbers are decreasing. In Spain the number of controlled companies increased slightly to 30%, in the UK it remained stable at around 5%. In Spain and the UK the largest group are companies with a shareholder with a voting block between 10% and 30%. In all four continental countries the number of companies with a widely dispersed ownership structure is around 10%. In 2 Belgium, Italy and France more companies developed towards the Berle and Means corporation, in Spain and the UK the number decreased.
In all civil law countries in this study, the majority of the largest shareholders are families or non-financial companies. However there are large differences between the civil law countries as well as over time. In France and Belgium families became more important and non-financial companies less important, in Italy the converse pattern is found, in Spain both types became more important due to the sale of stakes by banks and foreign shareholders. In Belgium and France foreign shareholder became the second most important group of largest shareholders. In Italy foreign shareholders are the third most important class of largest shareholders (after non-financial companies and families).
In the four continental European countries families are present in 35% to 55% of all listed companies, much more than in the UK where only one in four companies has one or more individuals -often board members -as major shareholders. The presence of board members in the shareholder orbit results in an average of 3 individuals in each UK listed company with individuals. In the UK and Italy direct family ownership is decreasing, in the other countries this type of shareholder acquired more stakes. Families have different investment policies in the different countries. In
France and in Italy they acquire de facto controlling shareholder blocks of 30% to more than 40%; in the UK, Spain and Belgium the average voting block of the family is less than 20%. Only in the latter country this average voting block changed over time from 23% to 19%. In all other countries the difference over a period of 8 years is less than 1%.
Non-financial companies are another important class of shareholders, at least in continental European countries. In 60% of all Spanish companies a non-financial company is a major shareholder. In Italy and Belgium this type of shareholder holds stakes in more than 40% of the companies. In one out of four listed companies, non financial companies are major shareholders in France and the UK. There are major differences between in investment policies of non-financial companies in continental countries. In Belgium and France non-financial companies disappeared between 1999 and 2007 as major shareholders in one out of five companies; in Spanish and Italian companies non-financial companies acquired significant stakes. Overall non-financial companies acquire only one to sometimes two significant stakes in listed entities. In Italy, where the number of companies with a non-financial companay as major shareholder increased, non-financial companies hold on average a de facto controlling voting block of more than 33% in over 40% of the listed entities with this type of shareholder. In France non-financial companies diminished their average stake from over a de facto controlling block to a non blocking minority of 27%. In Belgium and Spain this type of shareholder hold on average 20% of the voting rights, still well above the average voting block of the non-financial shareholder in a British company, which holds on average 14% of the votes.
The investment behaviour of banks significantly differs from country to country and over time. In Spain one listed company out of three has a bank as major shareholder.
In the other countries the number is approximately one bank as major shareholder in and 30% in the other countries. These averages hide substantial differences. Foreign shareholders could be further classified among the same shareholder classes.
Individual and non-financial foreign shareholders hold on average larges stakes than institutional foreign shareholders like insurance companies and banks.
This detailed analysis of ownership over eight years allows a more detailed analysis of its relationship with company and securities law. La Porta and others (1998, hereafter: LLSV) argued that large voting blocks serve as a substitute for weak investor protection rights. Lele and Siems (2007) developed the LLSV's index of investor protection rights in two indices relating to the protection against board and management and protection against other shareholders. Their database is used for two countries -France a large civil law country and the UK, a common law country -to study the relationship between company and securities law development and 5 ownership structures. In both countries the board protection index increased: 3% to 4% in the UK and 7% to 10% in France in the years before the year for which the data of the ownership were collected. The shareholder protection index did not change in the years before the year for which the data of the ownership were collected. Hence and given LLSV's hypothesis, it can be expected that more companies will become widely held whereas the sum of stakes of all but the largest shareholder will be stable.
The results by and large confirm LLSV's thesis, though the relationships are relatively weak. In France the number of de jure controlled companies decreased with 4%, the number of de facto controlled companies declined even with more than 7%.
In the UK the differences in the numbers of controlled companies are negligable. In 
